wilkes

Pike, your association with the group is evident and your response is natural so I am not offended by your snide remarks. To dismiss a fellow follower would put secrecy at risk and having the power to rescue would be eliminated. However, one bad apple spoils the whole bunch is at play also. No accountability is what we have seen in our government and you see the results. Hubba, Hubba

Fox,
Then by all means don't give to the Shriner's because of Stoney Greene if that's how you feel, I for one hope no one else follows your example; the greater good done by the Shriner's far outweighs anything Greene could have ever done...but that's just my opinion.

Albert Pike	Posted 10:28 pm, 03/19/2024
Fox, I believe you're thinking of the Shriners.

Does not change the facts. They are tied at the hip, allowing someone like this to be a member sure devalues what they say they are. Birds of a feather, gather together. You are known by the company you keep

The North Carolina General Statutes do not provide any guidance for the removal of municipal officials who are elected by the people. Under section 160A-148(1), municipal managers (i.e., for a city, town, or village) are vested with statutory authority to "appoint and suspend or remove all city officers and employees not elected by the people."' By implication, municipal managers lack the statutory authority to suspend or remove municipal officials who are elected by the people.3 This is problematic when, after a municipal official is elected and takes office, he engages in misconduct that should warrant removal from office, or when that official otherwise becomes unfit to hold office. The solution is found in North Carolina's common law, which provides judicial guidance addressing the removal of municipal elected officials through the process of amotion, based upon grounds constituting reasonable and just cause for removal from office.actual service of the summons and complaint within the same initial ninety-day period.52 North Carolina's statutory procedure for bringing an action in quo warranto to challenge a person's title to a public office or to challenge his legal capacity or qualification to hold office is fairly straightforward as codified under sections 1-514,13 1-515, 54 1-516, 55 1-522,56 and 1-528,57 of the North Carolina General Statutes. A statutory action in quo warranto can be brought in the name of the State under section 1-515, or by a private person with leave of the State under section 1-516, to challenge a municipal official's legal capacity or qualification to hold office.58 An action in quo warranto is not the appropriate procedure for challenging all office holders. For example, in Ledwell v. Proctor, the supreme court considered an appeal of a quo warranto action.59 The plaintiff "relator ' 60 sought to be declared the duly elected town alderman for a two-year term, to have the defendant ousted, and to recover all benefits received by the defendant from the elected office. 61 The supreme court ruled that a contestant for public office may not maintain a quo warranto action by merely alleging that election returns have shown that he received a majority of the votes cast, without further alleging that the returns have been canvassed, that the canvass has shown and declared him the duly elected candidate, and that a certificate of election was thereby issued to him.62 In Williams v. Somers, which involved an action in quo warranto, the supreme court considered a case in which a new clerk had been elected clerk of superior court. 63 The new clerk timely and properly tendered his bonds and was inducted into office. 64 The former clerk was present in court at the time, was cognizant of what was occurring, and did not object.65 The former clerk surrendered his office and records to the new clerk and retired from his official duties for twelve months.66 The court held that the conduct of the former clerk amounted to a surrender of his office to the court, justified the reception and induction into office of the newly elected clerk, and the office could not thereafter be properly challenged.67 In State ex rel. Barker v. Ellis, the court of appeals determined that an unsuccessful mayoral candidate had ample opportunity to be heard and was not denied due process by the ninety-day service requirement applicable to a quo warranto action. 68 The unsuccessful candidate filed administrative appeals and direct actions to overturn election results that delayed the mayor's swearing-in. 69 The unsuccessful candidate waited nearly two months before seeking permission from the Attorney General to institute a private quo warranto action and was granted permission to file nearly three weeks before the end of the ninety-day limitation period.7 ° The court held that the time for service of the summons and complaint could not be extended under the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure because the requirement that a private quo warranto action must be served on the mayor within ninety days of induction into office was prescribed by statute instead of being governed by the rules of civil procedure. 7' Although the specific issue in Ellis concerned the inapplicability of the rules of civil procedure to alter the ninety-day service requirement applicable to a quo warranto action, the court's ruling also held that the unsuccessful candidate had ample opportunity to be heard and was not denied due process.72 The ninety-day requirement for an action in quo warranto was also upheld in State ex rel. Long v. Smitherman.73 In Long, a private relator filed a quo warranto action to determine his right to the office of county sheriff and to challenge the defendant's right and title to the office.7 4 The court held that the action was properly dismissed because the summons and complaint were not filed within ninety days after the defendant's induction into the office of sheriff.

In Rhodes v. Love, the supreme court further explained the difference between an action in quo warranto and an action in mandamus. The plaintiff alleged that he was the duly elected and qualified treasurer of the Lincolnton Graded School Committee Corporation and that the defendant had the books, documents, and papers of the office in his possession but refused to deliver them to plaintiff.,, The plaintiff sought a mandamus to compel the defendant to turn over the books and records.82 The defendant moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the plaintiffs alleged remedy, if at all, would be by quo warranto and not by mandamus. 8 3 The trial court in Rhodes dismissed the action, and the supreme court affirmed, explaining the difference between a mandamus proceeding and an action in quo warranto as follows: We think the plaintiff has misconceived his remedy. It is evident, from the pleadings, that this is, in substance, an action by two contesting claimants to determine the title to an office and mandamus is not the proper proceeding in such a case. If an office is vacated and the rightful claimant seeks to be inducted into it by the body having jurisdiction of the matter, mandamus will lie to enforce his right, but where the controversy is between two rival claimants, the preferential right of the plaintiff must not only be clear, but it must be so adjudged in an action of quo warranto, or rather in an action in the nature of quo warranto, and especially is this true where the defendant is in possession of the office under a claim of right in him to hold it and exercise its functions or perform its duties. Although the proceeding may be in the name of the state upon the relation or complaint of a private party, it is none the less personal as to the parties claiming the office; the issue between them being the right to the same.84 As shown by the decision in Rhodes, an action in mandamus is not the proper proceeding to resolve an action between two claimants who are contesting title to an office. Mandamus will only be appropriate if an office is still vacant and a rightful claimant seeks to be inducted into the office by the proper municipal body. However,where the controversy is between two rival claimants, and the individual defending his right to hold the office is already in possession of the office, the plaintiff challenging the defendant's right to hold the office must file an action in the nature of quo warranto.8s Even though a quo warranto proceeding may be filed in the name of the state upon the relation or complaint of a private party, it is still a personal action concerning each of the parties who are claiming the right to hold the office.8 6 In State ex rel Freeman v. Ponder, the supreme court explained the procedure for bringing an action in quo warranto to challenge a person's title to a public office or to challenge his legal capacity or qualification to hold office: The statutes codified as Article 41 of Chapter 1 of the General Statutes prescribe a specific mode for trying the title to a public office. Such relief is to be sought in a civil action. But a private person cannot institute or maintain an action of this character in his own name or upon his own authority, even though he be a claimant of the office. The action must be brought and prosecuted in the name of the state by the Attorney-General; or in the name of the state upon the relation of a private person, who claims to be entitled to the office, or in the name of the State upon the relation of a private person, who is a citizen and taxpayer of the jurisdiction where the officer is to exercise his duties and powers. Before any private person can commence or maintain an action of this nature in the capacity of a relator, he must apply to the Attorney-General for permission to bring the action, tender to the Attorney-General satisfactory security to indemnify the State against all costs and expenses incident to the action, and obtain leave from the Attorney-General to bring the action in the name of the State upon his relation. A single action may be brought against all persons claiming the same office to try their respective rights to the office
In Comer v. Ammons, the court of appeals explained the purpose of an action in quo warranto and distinguished it from a declaratory judgment action.88 In Comer, a registered voter sued several elected district court judges seeking a declaration that the statutes allowing the judges to simultaneously run for superior court and district court
udgeships were unconstitutional.8 9 The issue in Comer was that sections 163-106 and 163-323, when considered together, created a loophole allowing a candidate to run for a superior court seat and another office on the same election day, regardless of the filing periods.90 The court of appeals held the statute that codifies the commonlaw doctrine of quo warranto did not apply because the voter was not directly challenging the election or its results, but rather the main thrust of his argument was that the election statutes themselves were unconstitutional.91 The court upheld the constitutionality of the statutes and affirmed summary judgment in favor of the elected defendant judges.92 The significance of the Comer decision is that an action in quo warranto is not an appropriate procedure to challenge the application of election statutes where the complaining party is not directly challenging an election or its results, but rather is arguing that the election statutes themselves are unconstitutional, which should be addressed in a declaratory judgment action.


to effect removal of a school committeeman, specifying that he "shall be given notice of the proceeding, and of the charges against him, and afforded an opportunity to be heard and to produce testimony in his defense," and that he shall not be removed from office unless the county board of education "determines after a full and fair hearing on the merits that one or more of the specified causes for removal has been established by the evidence."9' In addressing the issue regarding the manner in which an ousted school committeeman can obtain court review of an action by the county board of education in removing him from office, the supreme court observed: [Section] 1-269 expressly stipulates that "writs of certiorari .. are authorized as heretofore in use." It is well settled in this jurisdiction that certiorari is the appropriate process to review the proceedings of inferior courts and of bodies and officers exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions in cases where no appeal is provided by law. Hence, we conclude that the Superior Court, which is the highest court of original jurisdiction in this State, has the power to review by certiorari the action of a county board of education in removing a school committeeman from his office. This decision finds full support in well considered cases in other States holding that when a governmental agency has power to remove a public officer only for cause after a hearing, the ouster proceeding is judicial or quasi-judicial in its nature, and may be reviewed by certiorari.96 This conclusion is supported by authority generally observing that, "[clertiorari will lie to review the act of a governmental agency in removing a public officer when such removal is based on an order entered after a hearing at which the respondent is given an opportunity
to be heard.'97 The context of Russ concerned utilization of the process of amotion for removal of an appointed school committeeman, specifically referring to statutory provisions applicable in that particular case under section 115-74,98 rather than addressing the removal of an elected municipal official, which is the subject of this Article. Despite these noted differences, it would nevertheless appear that under the guidance expressed by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in Russ, utilization of the following procedure would be consistent with affording the same due process concerns reflected in prior amotion cases addressing the proper procedure for removal of an elected municipal official: (1) the official should be given adequate notice of the proceeding and of the charges against him; (2) he should be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to produce testimony in his defense; (3) he should not be removed from office unless it is determined after a full and fair hearing on the merits that reasonable and just cause for removal has been established by the evidence; (4) minutes should be kept of the meetings; and (5) since the proceeding for amotion is judicial or quasi-judicial in character, the ousted municipal official should be entitled to have the action reviewed in superior

that Mayor Quinn was given a fair hearing but the facts of the case were insufficient to support removing the mayor from office. 117 On appeal, the rulings were presented to the supreme court together with complete transcripts of the hearings before the board of aldermen and the trial court." 8 The city charter provided that the board of aldermen could remove the mayor from office for prolonged absence, inattention to duty, mental or physical incapacity, incompetency, crime, immorality, or misconduct by vote as long as at least ten aldermen were present. 1 9 The mayor-argued that the removal process was unfair due to an alleged conspiracy to extricate him from his office along with allegations of prejudice by a number of aldermen. 120 His counsel examined nine of the fourteen aldermen before the trial court and other witnesses were also presented to support the charge.' 2 ' After hearing the evidence, the trial court found that the hearing was fair, that all of the aldermen in question were eligible to participate in the proceeding, and that the mayor's opportunity to defend himself was more than adequate.' 22 The supreme court determined the evidence supported the trial court's findings and rulings. The court observed that the city charter provided the tribunal and prescribed the standards for removal. 123 It held that all of the procedures required by the statute were adequate and that the procedures were followed correctly. 124 Rejecting the mayor's argument of unfairness and prejudice, the court noted that the charter prescribed a tribunal whose members would always be acquainted with the parties and would have some knowledge of the facts. 1 25 In this respect, it was different from the ordinary approach of using a judge and jury.126 "It has been generally held for example that aldermen are not disqualified from voting on charges because they served on a committee that formulated the charges."'127 The court stated: Findings which result from an unfair hearing or a prejudiced tribunal will not be sustained. However, it must be recognized that in this case the Legislature intended removal proceedings to be conducted by the aldermen who may bring the charge and some of whom may have substantial knowledge of the evidence to be presented, or may have had differences from time to time with the person whose removal is sought. 128 The court continued: The Trial Court correctly held that certiorari may not be invoked to review findings of fact and that the Court was limited to an inquiry of law whether the finding or verdict could reasonably be made. Unless the evidence shows that the conclusion could not have been reasonably reached, the action taken will be held valid.1 29 In light of these principles, the supreme court determined that the trial court had been wrong to substitute its judgment for that of the city aldermen, and explained that [tihe fact that another tribunal might find that the misconduct was not such as to justify removal does not permit a substitution of the judgment of others for that of the board of aldermen where the charter leaves this judgment to them. The charter states that "The board of aldermen may ... remove... for . . . misconduct in office." Whether or not misconduct is "such misconduct" as to justify removal is therefore left to the aldermen and this court will not disturb their finding that it was. 13 0 For these reasons, the petition for writ of supersedeas was dismissed, the petition for writ of certiorari was granted, and the order of the trial court was set aside.1 3 1 The decisions in Morris and Quinn are consistent with North Carolina decisions holding that if the requisite steps are taken to provide notice and an opportunity for a fair hearing on the merits to ensure that the evidence establishes reasonable and just cause for removal, then elected officials can be removed by a municipal governing body through the process of amotion. elected officer because a public office is not considered to be "private property." 132 In Mial v. Ellington, the supreme court professed "the wisdom of holding that a public office is not private property, thus preventing the state and its agencies from performing its functions in respect to its internal government" and ensuring municipal officers do not have a property interest in the state's sovereignty. 133 Notwithstanding the rule providing that "a public office is not private property,"134 Jenkins establishes that an elected municipal official should be given notice and an opportunity to be heard and there should be sufficient cause shown for his removal from office.' 35 The Corpus Juris Secundum recognizes the requirement of notice and a hearing in this context as follows: When the tenure of a municipal officer is at the pleasure of the appointing body, the power to remove may be exercised without notice or hearing. Where the appointment, however, is for a fixed term or during good behavior, or where the removal must be for cause, the power of removal ordinarily can be exercised only on charges preferred, after notice and hearing, with a reasonable opportunity to be heard before the officer or body having the power to remove.13 6 The cases discussed in this Article demonstrate that under North Carolina law, an elected municipal official can be removed for misconduct subsequent to his election if a proper procedure is carried out for his removal, including: giving adequate notice of a scheduled proceeding; providing an opportunity to be heard regarding the charges against the official and to produce testimony in his defense; affording a full and fair hearing on the merits; and documenting the proceedings through recorded minutes. Since the process of amotion is considered to be judicial or quasi-judicial in character, the ousted municipal cial should be entitled to have the action reviewed in superior court through certiorari review, which should be limited to an inquiry of law regarding whether the findings supporting the removal could reasonably have been made. The following is a practical procedural guide for municipalities, legal practitioners, and the courts that is consistent with the mutual goal of protecting due process concerns and ensuring a fair and reasonable result. In order to satisfy due process concerns, the longstanding line of amotion cases require notice and an opportunity to be heard before an elected municipal official can be removed from office for just cause. Decisions such as Russ, which was decided in a nonmunicipal context, also focus on due process concerns prior to enabling removal of an official from office. Because the overriding concern in both contexts is one of ensuring due process for the official during the removal process, from a jurisprudential standpoint, it makes sense to apply the newer guidelines outlined in Russ to the removal of an elected municipal official. The collective wisdom of the decisions cited above' 37 demonstrates that it is reasonable and prudent to observe and maintain compliance with the following practical procedural guidelines for removal of an elected municipal official for just cause. Please note that these procedural guidelines are only practical suggestions by this author and are not required under North Carolina law, except to the extent expressly provided by the North Carolina decisions discussed above. Naturally, if a municipality has specific procedures or guidelines already in place under its own charter, by-laws, municipal code, ordinances, rules, or regulations addressing any of these matters, then the municipality should follow them instead.

I agree woodie. Still does not make since that they refused to do a study. They totally have a lack of experience and never should have been elected. If this is the best the county can do, heaven help us.

Albert Pike (view profile)	Posted 11:06 pm, 03/19/2024
Clarence, Everything you said is true, my point to Foxnose is it is the Shriners who collect donations at intersections and not the Mason's, while all Shriners are Masons, but not all Masons are Shriners.

Agreed Mr. Pike.

Stoney Greene board appointments.

If you can't trust him with dogs can you trust him with kids? https://www.ncacc.org/count...committee/

Aint got anything to do with Shriners/Masons.

He will probably remain on the board until the next election. I don't think they can remove him as he is elected and hasn't committed any crime as a commissioner while elected. The other commissioners most probably can remove him from any board he was appointed to. Basically, he most probably be just warming a chair and voting. To bad we can't get rid of all three who voted to spend all those millions on a building that I don't see prospering the whole county.

Clarence,
Everything you said is true, my point to Foxnose is it is the Shriners who collect donations at intersections and not the Mason's, while all Shriners are Masons, but not all Masons are Shriners.

Albert Pike (view profile)	Posted 10:28 pm, 03/19/2024
Fox, I believe you're thinking of the Shriners.

To be a Shriner you are a Mason. The Shriners work very hard to raise money for a children's hospital where they care for kids. The kids family never receive a bill. The Shriners are upstanding people. I have been told Stoney belongs to the Mason lodge in Traphill not where he lives. I was told the local lodge near his home would not allow him in.

Are the Masonic guys dog fighters too? Or just criminals like him? Do not know anything about them. If they are not, did they know his past?

Fox,
I believe you're thinking of the Shriners.

Please remember that Stoney is a member of the Masonic Lodge next time a red bucket is waved in front of you in heavy traffic. They should not allow this type person but he seems to fit in well.

JC, I just realized that it was you that I was thanking. Just thought you were just one of us. We really do appreciate you and your site. It is unbelievable that people can search online and find all all of this evidence and our sheriff's department has not done one thing in all of these years to investigate him when all we hear is that everybody knew this. Now they have proof in his own words, in Facebook postings, and ads that he paid for, so will they once again, ignore it?,

Yes we did. There's no room for someone who enjoys harming and profiting from the harm animals.

Hope you can make it. To the next related session JC.
Be GREAT to finally met you dude. Seriously.
Maybe we can speak in binary. So nobody will understand us.
😂
Animals feel pain too. I'm not gonna bash this person.
Yall are doing a bang up jerb.
Cool,until then. :)

I can't believe we all found something we can agree on.

Stoney knows the people will not tolerate this. I hope this is a lesson to other elected officials WE THE PEOPLE of WILKES will no longer tolerate corruption.

@interesting fact, I did not! I'm pretty sure that they picked it up after Mr. Pacelle sent out that press release.